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Until recently, the international border between Canada and the U.S. was frequently referred to as 
the world‘s longest ‗unguarded‘ or ‗friendly‘ border. While the border was never truly left unguarded, 
Canadian and U.S. citizens enjoyed relatively open borders, without the enforcement of passport 
requirements. On September 11, 2001, the porous border that had symbolized international co-
operation, friendship and the world‘s largest bilateral trade relationship, was abruptly re-defined in 
the public eye as a potential liability in the U.S. national defense system.  
In a post-9/11 environment, a new sense of vulnerability crept into the American psyche. Reducing 
the risks of terrorism became an immediate priority—and border policies and protocols that 
encouraged relatively unimpeded traffic flow became objects of immediate political scrutiny.  
Over the past decade, border policies and infrastructures have changed under the mandate of 
national security. Canadian and U.S. border policies have undergone multiple re-writes; government 
agencies have re-organized; and physical infrastructures have been re-designed and re-built. Social 
infrastructures of Canada-U.S. borderlands have also undergone transformation, largely in response 
to new perceptions of risk. 
The first decade of the 21st century has invited an intensified dialog about the roles of international 
borders in a multitude of Canada-U.S. relationships. An abrupt decision to close U.S. ports of entry 
in the hours and days immediately following 9/11 affected businesses and travelers en masse by 
creating a temporarily relatively impassable border. The intervening years have been characterized by 
changing regulatory and social conditions of passage. Both the Canadian and U.S. federal 
governments have re-organized the legal and regulatory environment of the shared border.  
In a context of international business, the uncertainty associated with changing laws and protocols 
can have serious ramifications. Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), firms with time-
sensitive cross-border supply chains, and firms located in proximity to the border are potentially at 
greater risk than larger firms, as well as firms that are located a longer distance from the border.  
This paper explores the effects of changing border regulations on the business environments of two 
key cross-border trading regions. Surveys detailing the effects of and responses to changing border 
regulations on individual businesses are supplemented with qualitative interviews with individuals, 
businesses, and institutions that serve supporting roles to businesses in their respective communities. 
By including supporting actors (i.e., those who frequently mitigate border-related challenges on 
behalf of their business customers), this paper explores challenges from a uniquely-informed 
perspective.  
Historic Context: Business in the Canada – U.S. Borderlands 
Canada and the U.S. share the worldwide distinction of the single largest bilateral trading 
relationship—a distinction that has endured for decades. This relationship has been institutionalized 
and reinforced by a series of broadly-sweeping trade agreements—notably the AutoPact (1965), the 
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, CUSFTA (1989), and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, NAFTA (1994).  
It is worth noting that, while the U.S. and Canada generate more two-way trade than any other 
country pair, the Canadian economy is proportionally more reliant on access to the U.S. economy 




Canadian market, nearly 75% of Canadian exports are destined for the U.S. market. For the 
purposes of this study, it is assumed that similar proportions likely hold at the level of the firm.  
Cross-border trade between Canada and the U.S. is not limited to traditional imports and exports of 
finished goods. Canadian and U.S.-based firms have frequently selected strategies such as Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) in order to gain access to the cross-border inputs and markets, as well as to 
take advantage of differences in the economic and political structures between the two countries. 
(see Harrington et.al. 1986; MacPherson, 1997; Morgans, 2007). Indeed, a majority of manufactured 
goods that cross the border are un-finished products within intra-firm supply chains that may cross 
multiple times before they are market-ready (Andrea and Smith, 2002; Blank, 2007a, 2007b; Mingus, 
2002; Quayes and Pescatrice, 2004 ).  
When describing complex intra-firm supply chains such as those of large auto manufacturers, it is 
important to point out that flexible cross-border supply chains increasingly rely on inputs from 
SMEs. Components may be manufactured by small firms in related and diverse auto parts industries. 
In many cases, such highly-specialized and closely-related firms tend to locate in close proximity to 
their major suppliers, customers, and competitors.1   
Political economist Stephen Blank describes this system of inter-twined economic systems, inter-
linked industrial districts and labor markets, and cross-border supply chains as a continental system 
of ‗deep structural integration‘ (Blank, 2008). He argues that the competitive economic strength held 
by Canada, the U.S. and Mexico is mutually reinforcing, and relies heavily on the facilitation of 
intricate cross-border networks and supply chains. If these supply chains are disrupted by, for 
instance, inconsistent border crossing times and procedures, negative consequences can quickly 
ripple throughout the three countries‘ inter-linked economies, affecting not only sales of finished 
products, but the availability of work.  
When speaking of North American structural integration and success, it is critical to note the uneven 
geography of competition and economic activity. In many cases, North American borderlands 
represent instrumental locations for highly-integrated supply chains. Constraints of time and 
distance can be minimized for firms located in proximity to each other. When a fluid border falls 
within an otherwise cohesive industrial district, benefits related to cross-border locations can also be 
realized.  
Many of the advantages that are derived from easy access and proximity to cross-border locations 
are at least partially attributable to border policies that facilitate easy, predictable, and inexpensive 
transport of goods and people. These benefits are particularly important to manufacturers that have 
increasingly turned to Just-in-Time (JIT) systems that rely on prompt delivery of inputs. 
Cross-Border Regions 
Regional and urban economic development scholars have pointed to the importance of inter-firm 
networks in regional industrial success. A firm‘s network involves a wide range of formal and 
informal contacts and is characterized by interdependency of relationships. Involvement in regional 
networks enables participating firms to access business opportunities as well as agglomeration-
specific skills and tacit knowledge (McLean and Vance, 2002; Malecki and Tootle, 1996; Scott, 
1992). Networks are of interest, not only to firms that directly benefit from the formal and informal 
contacts, but also to professionals involved in local economic development, as places compete with 
each other in attracting investment.  
                                                 




Firms located in localized cross-border industrial districts can glean the benefits that come from 
involvement in regional networks, as well as those that come from easy access to two national 
markets, and the complementarities of political and economic conditions at multiple scales. As long 
as border crossings are fluid and accessible, it is not difficult to imagine a highly-localized cluster of 
interdependent industrial regions. Indeed, historically, it could be argued that the automotive 
industry has created such an environment throughout the bi-national Great Lakes region. 
Borderlands scholarship points to the interconnectivity of cross-border regions (PRI, 2008; Konrad 
and Nicol, 2008). However, borders do continue to present challenges to residents and businesses in 
the borderlands—especially during times of shifting border governance regimes or economic 
change. Cross-border regions may be uniquely situated in terms of the geographic nature of business 
networks. Understanding the geography of inter-firm networks within cross-border regions can 
reveal how integrated cross-border regional economies are. The types of networks that span the 
border (or fail to span the border) can indicate the extent to which cross-border businesses perceive 
each other as local or international competitors, or whether they have extensive local cooperative 
interactions.  
Borderland locations have the potential to become strategically important for international business. 
However, the benefits associated with borderland locations can also become vulnerabilities during 
times of shifting political and economic environments. Fluctuations in exchange rates, for example, 
can send price-savvy shoppers from one side of the border to the other for decades at a time, and 
can cause cost-conscious manufacturers to drop long term suppliers in favor of overseas 
competitors. Changes in Canadian or U.S. national border or trade policies can, likewise, affect real 
and perceived costs either directly (as in the case of tariffs), or can act as non-tariff barriers as a 
consequence of border delays or systematic ‗thickening‘ of border crossing procedures. 
In short, the mix of complementarities within cross-border regions is subject to change. Policies that 
have the potential to shut down, delay or complicate border crossings also have the potential to 
sever cross-border supply chains, and weaken local borderland economies to a much greater extent 
than is likely to be witnessed in generalized national, provincial, or state-level figures.  
Cross-border regions represent locations of tremendous opportunity during times when economic 
and political environments are favorable. They also represent locations of great vulnerability 
depending on the nature and direction of economic and political shifts. Local borderland-located 
businesses and communities are affected by shifts in border policies and exchange rate fluctuations, 
for example, in advance of communities that are geographically removed from borders, and with 
greater intensity. Consequently, borderlands also represent locations where creative solutions are, 
out of experience and necessity, likely to be found in response to potentially harmful top-down 
regulatory shifts that have direct or indirect implications to cross-border interactions.  
Cross-border regions provide unique laboratories for understanding effects of national-level border 
policies, international trade agreements, and economic shifts for some basic geographic reasons. 
Waldo Tobler‘s First Law of Geography states ―Everything is related to everything else, but near 
things are more related to each other.‖ In a community context, this implies that people who live 
and work in proximity to each other are more likely to interact with each other than they are to 
interact with people who are geographically distant. In a context where a relatively porous 
international border divides neighborhoods, interactions should not be impeded greatly by the 
presence of the border.  
Victor Konrad and Heather N. Nicol (2008) and PRI researchers (2008), among others, have 




thus, extends beyond political delineation. Cultural, linguistic, historic, political, legal and economic 
similarities are both consequences and facilitators of cross-border interaction.    
It follows that businesses located in proximity to a porous international market are more likely to try 
(and succeed at) entering that particular market due in part to geographic and social proximity. 
Cross-border regions can be expected to be highly inter-connected relative to international 
connections between non-neighboring communities. 
Shifts in national political, economic and legal environments that neighbor each other across a 
border line will arguably be felt most intensely by the people, businesses and communities that flank 
the border, as they are more likely than more distant neighbors to cross for routine activities.  
Assuming a fluid border, and easy access to two strong national economies, borderlands regions may 
present a special case for regional competitiveness in a global economic system. Michael Porter 
(1990) drew attention to the idea that nations compete with each other for investment in a global 
economy, and that the success of international firms depends largely on the natures of the 
environment that incubated them. At the geographic junction of two international economies, firms 
may glean benefits of complementary systems and gain early experience in international trade. 
Hence, firms within borderlands regions may be well-equipped to compete in an international 
marketplace, and borderlands regions themselves may be attractive locations for industrial 
investment.  
The 21st Century Canada – U.S. Border 
The terrorist attacks in 2001 prompted a temporary emergency shutdown of the U.S. transportation 
system. Airports were closed, U.S.-bound commercial flights were grounded at airports world-wide, 
and all major ports of entry into the U.S. from Canada and Mexico saw unprecedented delays. Many 
residents of cross-border regions vividly recall impressive truck lineups at major crossings that, in 
some cases, forced temporary halts to JIT manufacturing processes.  
In the moments after 9/11, the border between the U.S. and Canada was abruptly re-defined. The 
porosity of the border had previously been celebrated, institutionalized and held up as a model for 
international relations and trade. After 9/11, the fluid border came to represent a flawed system of 
U.S. national defense.  
An initial wave of published works addressing the new context of the vulnerable border tended to 
rest on assumptions that physical security could only be attained with increased screening at border 
entryways, and that lengthy border wait times would be a natural and necessary consequence. This 
assumption fueled a heated and emotional debate that pitted scenarios of physical security directly 
against those of economic security, assuming increased border delays and inconsistencies. 
Arguments on both sides were driven by fear—fear of another terrorist attack on one hand, and fear 
of a damaged North American economy and a dysfunctional border on the other. 
A number of articles in this initial wave projected estimated damages to state, provincial, national 
and continental economies, and indicated a growing sentiment that anti-terrorism measures at the 
border would necessarily ‗trump trade‘ (Dobson, 2002; McMahon and Curtis, 2004; Goldfarb, 2004; 
Robson and Goldfarb, 2002; Harvey, 2004). For the most part, these early projections and 
observations indicated worse proportional damages to the Canadian economy than to the U.S. This 
is not surprising at the national level, given the asymmetrical economic relationship that 




At the level of the firm, this also seems to have been the case. If Canadian firms are, in fact, 
proportionally more dependent on access to the huge U.S. market, it would be expected that 
Canadian firms would also have been more negatively affected by a hardened border than their U.S. 
counterparts. A study by MacPherson, McConnell, Vance and Vanchan (2006) suggests that, as of 
2004, this had been the case for firms in the Niagara Gateway region. Furthermore, they observed, 
Canadian firms are more likely to have both forward and backward linkages that traverse the border. 
The same study also revealed an interesting trend in terms of likely firm level strategic responses. 
U.S.-located participants were more likely than their Canadian counterparts to entertain strategies of 
cross-border disinvestment (i.e. replacing Canadian suppliers with U.S.-based suppliers). Canadian 
participants apparently anticipated the possibility of U.S. disinvestment. They were more likely than 
their U.S. counterparts to sense border-related vulnerability and entertained an extensive range of 
alternative strategies including costly geographic strategies such as physical relocation and 
investment in additional facilities.  
Many studies addressing 9/11 impacts on cross-border trade have been conducted at the national, 
state or provincial scales (Burt, 2009; Globerman and Storer, 2006, 2008, 2009; OCC, 2004). Few 
have specifically set out to address the conditions within cross-border localities. There are several 
reasons for this, notably that: (1) Economic data tend to be aggregated at larger scales; (2) Cross-
border regions are difficult to define and may not follow predetermined jurisdictional lines; (3) 
Policies dealing with ‗national security‘ are likely to be made with attention paid to state, provincial 
and national scales—recognizing borderland localities essentially as ‗interest groups‘; (4) Data 
sharing can be difficult between jurisdictions due to different definitions and informal spatial 
delineation. As a consequence, there is a gap in the literature about cross-border regions at 
meaningful local scales2.  
Cross-border regions are becoming increasingly recognized as locations of competitive advantage in 
the global economy (see PRI, 2008). Benefits of accessing complementary systems and 
environments within a local sphere of shared culture and meaning are described earlier in this paper, 
and help to explain the rationale underlying this notion of competitive locational advantage.  
From a research perspective, borderlands regions present an interesting laboratory for understanding 
the effects of policy shifts on local economies. Borderlands-located firms and communities are likely 
to experience political and economic shifts immediately, and with greater intensity than national, 
provincial or state reports would reflect. Firms located within Canada-U.S. cross-border regions face 
tremendous location-specific advantages; however they also inherit location-specific risks and 
vulnerabilities during times of institutional and regulatory change. 
Literature Review 
The first wave of reflective academic literature addressing the actual impacts of 9/11 on trade 
between Canada and the U.S. emerged two years after the 2001 attacks. Scholarly studies have, for 
the most part, reached conclusions pointing to economic damage as a consequence of regulatory 
changes at the border. The Canadian and U.S. economies were negatively impacted and North 
American businesses absorbed a range of negative externalities including increased costs related to 
cross-border logistics and voluntary compliance programs, as well as damaged commercial 
relationships. (see MacPherson et. al. 2006 for an overview). 
                                                 
2 In response to this gap in local borderlands research, programs such as the Border Policy Research Institute at Western 
Washington University and the Regional Institute and the Canada – U.S. Trade Center, both at the University at Buffalo, 




Negative effects were arguably the most pronounced in the months immediately following 9/11, and 
appear to have tapered off thereafter. Several studies offer an explanation of evolving institutional 
and personal learning curves, and strategic adjustments by firms with a stake in the maintenance of 
fluid and reliable cross-border access (Burt, 2009; Globerman and Storer, 2008, 2009; Vance 2008a, 
2008b).  
With changes in policy come changes in the consequences of those policies on businesses, 
individuals and communities. Today, businesses continue to experience challenges related to border 
policy, but the nature of the challenges seems to have shifted. In the immediate wake of 9/11, 
inquiries focused on the conditions of border crossing locations themselves. Uncertain delays caused 
anxiety for both the business community and casual travelers alike.  
In the intervening years, policies have shifted toward a paradigm that physically moves 
administrative processes away from the geographic border, effectively ‗thickening‘ the border. 
Policies have also shifted toward greater reliance on technological solutions to move traffic through 
common chokepoints. Automated customs processing and prior-notice requirements present one 
example. Exporting firms are required to fill out extensive standardized paperwork that must arrive 
at customs at least one hour prior to the arrival of the shipment. In order to streamline processes at 
the border, administrative functions increase at home offices—thereby geographically ‗thickening‘ 
the administrative border. Although wait times can actually decrease at border crossings as a 
consequence, the total time investment required to successfully move products and personnel across 
the border has arguably increased. Other concerns for businesses are somewhat more removed from 
the border. One example cited by Vance (2008) is rising costs for cross-border shipments. After 
9/11, many logistics firms are reported to have modified their pricing structures in order to 
compensate for potential idle time at the border.  
If necessity is the mother of innovation, firms and individuals whose livelihoods are dependent on 
cross-border access are compelled to find solutions that will help them maintain cross-border 
connections in light of a changing regulatory environment.  
Some options that have been explored by firms include increased outsourcing of expertise, 
strengthening relationships between participants in international supply chains, changing the 
location of some operations, increasing warehousing, and seeking options to replace North 
American products with price-competitive products sourced overseas (Vance, 2008). Such strategies 
have worked well for many, and have proven more appealing to firms than enrollment in voluntary 
U.S. and Canadian government-sponsored programs such as FAST3, C-TPAT4 and PIP.5  
Since 2004, negative effects at border crossings seem to have decreased, as a consequence of firm-
level strategic adjustments and overlapping institutional learning curves among border stakeholders. 
One particular strategy that was emphasized in a 2006 study (Vance, 2008a, 2008b) was that some 
borderland-located firms were less likely to use company vehicles in the transport of goods and 
employees across the border than they had been prior to 2001. It was not uncommon for firms to 
report greater reliance on third parties for customs brokerage and transportation services. Most 
interview participants in this study described the importance of maintaining close, long-term 
                                                 
3 Free And Secure Trade, a voluntary compliance program that pre-approves registered truckers for expedited clearance 
through Canadian and U.S. customs. 
4 Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, a voluntary U.S. government compliance program that offers expedited 
processing at customs for companies whose supply chains have been approved and deemed secure by U.S. Customs.  




relationships with service providers. Managers frequently described the relationship itself as being of 
greater importance than price-based competitiveness or other transactional efficiencies.    
Formation of relationships between firms and international service providers seems to have become 
a key strategy for many SMEs during this period of fluctuating border regulations. By subcontracting 
for services that may once have been routine (such as cross-border deliveries), firms are able to 
focus on core competencies rather than concerning themselves with details related to a changing 
regulatory environment. 
Negative effects continue to linger, but firms for the most part seem to have adjusted well to the 
new security environment, and trade between Canada and the U.S. continues to rebuild. Indeed, 
many of the setbacks cited by firms after 2006 seem to focus on issues such as the price of fuel and 
exchange rate fluctuations rather than direct regulatory hurdles (Vance 2008a, 2008b).  
This is encouraging news from the standpoint of any border stakeholder, but some concerns remain. 
In particular, it is important to note that Canadian and U.S. laws concerning border governance 
continue to evolve. The U.S. Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, for example, went into effect in 
2008, requiring U.S., Canadian, and Mexican border crossers to present a passport or other secure 
photo document that verifies citizenship. The regulatory environment surrounding the border thus 
continues to change. Firms, individuals, and government employees must continually adjust to the 
changing environment.  
Furthermore, concerns still remain that another unforeseen emergency could lead to another border 
slowdown. Questions concerning adjustments and strategies related to border-crossings are still 
highly relevant today. Firms seeking to mitigate risks related to changing policies or possible future 
emergencies are likely to consider network-building strategies.  
Strategic Responses 
Current border policies and management practices in Canada and the U.S. can best be described as 
evolutionary processes. Issues surrounding the roles and natures of national borders are in flux, as 
are border-related problems and their solutions.  
If the policy environment can be described as a series of moving regulatory targets, then those who 
are charged with the responsibility of enforcing policy are engaged in continuous learning curves. 
Likewise, individuals and businesses that engage in border crossing activity must be flexible and able 
to adapt to new protocols and the challenges associated with navigating an environment where most 
actors are simultaneously navigating and learning about changing conditions. (See Vance, 2008 for 
further discussion). Firms that require consistent cross-border access are reported to have 
formulated a variety of strategies to mitigate risks related to border crossing activities. Some notable 
strategies are identified by MacPherson et. al. (2006) and Vance (2008a, 2008b).  
Few studies addressing the impacts of regulatory shifts on businesses after 9/11 have been 
conducted at the level of the firm, or with a specific focus on firms located in borderland locations. 
Studies that fit these criteria used surveys of borderland-located businesses (MacPherson, et. al., 
2006) or face-to-face interviews with executives as primary research methods (Vance, 2008a, 2008b; 
Goldfarb, 2007). This study begins with a survey of borderland-located businesses but then goes one 
step further and adds the dimension of cross-border business networks. 
A common response to a thickening border is to thicken cross-border supply chains. The most 




often by adding links to supply chains such as increased usage of third parties for services such as 
logistics, warehousing and customs brokerage (Vance 2008a, 2008b).  
A metaphor of geographic ‗thickening‘ has been applied as a common description of administrative 
changes in border policies since 2001. Border thickening protocols include advance notice for cross-
border shipments and increased documentation requirements overall. In effect, protocols for border 
crossing shipments are pushed away from the physical location of the customs booth. Indeed, in a 
2006 interview-based study, 100 percent of interviewed executives described increased 
documentation requirements, and increased time allocations for the completion of additional 
customs paperwork (Vance, 2008).  
Additional factors that may contribute to a thickening border (i.e., widening of the border-located 
structural barrier) include increasing or unpredictable border wait times, changes to the pricing 
structure of cross-border transportation services, increasing fuel prices, passport requirements, 
economic declines, ‗buy American‘ and ‗buy Canadian‘ provisions, and general negative perceptions 
of the border.  
Social Networks 
Social network scholars have found that businesses and individuals are more likely to succeed when 
they are connected into multiple minimally-overlapping networks. Mark Granovetter‘s (1973) theory 
of ‗weak ties‘ provides a framework for illustrating the nature of business networks and can be 
applied to a cross-border context. ‗Weak ties,‘ or contacts with whom one is loosely socially 
connected, are likely to have access to different information and social contacts, whereas contacts 
with whom one is closely connected (‗strong ties‘) are more likely to possess redundant information. 
In a business context, access to diverse sources and types of information and personal and 
professional contacts can be critical for finding and winning contracts, business expansion, and 
ultimately entrepreneurial success.  
Ronald Burt‘s work on social capital builds from Granovetter‘s theory. Burt takes one step back, 
recognizing that in order for ‗weak ties‘ to exist in a meaningful way, there must first exist 
information gaps. Burt refers to information gaps between networks as ‗structural holes‘ (Burt, 
1997). Structural holes represent often significant hurdles between people in different networks. 
They also represent potential opportunities, as individuals and organizations that successfully bridge 
them are well positioned for success relative to their peers. In a 1997 study, Burt demonstrates that 
managers who effectively make connections between otherwise independent networks are more 
likely to succeed in innovative and entrepreneurial ventures.  
In a cross-border region, the border can be thought of as a location potentially riddled with 
structural holes. Actors located on one side of the border are more likely to have frequent 
interactions and close, redundant connections (‗strong ties‘) with others who are located on the same 
side of the border. They are likely to have intimate knowledge of their immediate business 
environment and may have limited information about the business environment just across the 
political boundary. Firms and individuals on the other side of the political boundary have ‗strong 
ties‘ within a separate parallel network and have access to other specific sets of information. Sharing 
of information and meaning is somewhat constrained by border protocols and processes. 
Knowledge gaps are produced in this type of environment. These knowledge gaps can be thought of 
as structural holes. Successful cross-border connections represent bridges across a structural hole 
that theoretically coincides with the international border. During times of regulatory change, the 




themselves and their networks up to speed with new information, as others do the same. The 
exchange of information and learning can bridge these information gaps eventually. The challenge is 
to navigate the changing environment effectively, particularly during times of tumult.  
Actors who successfully bridge information gaps are well-positioned to access diverse information 
and opportunities compared to those linked only into redundant geographically localized networks.  
Furthermore, individuals, organizations and firms that possess specialized knowledge about the 
border and who have established footholds in abutting near-border social networks may be well-
positioned to create and preserve bridges spanning structural holes for firms that seek their services 
by assuming intermediary roles. In the case of borderland business communities, bridges might be 
represented by:  (1) businesses that successfully enter the cross-border market; and (2) network 
intermediaries that facilitate SMEs‘ cross-border connections. Intermediaries could include any 
individuals, businesses or organizations that have specialized knowledge or provide services to SMEs 
that are interested in crossing the border. 
International trade scholars have emphasized the effects of informal barriers to trade in light of 
overall declining tariffs and transportation costs.6 In order to overcome informal barriers and 
succeed in an international marketplace, successful firms must possess specialized knowledge. 
Individuals and businesses that possess ‗deep knowledge‘ are well-positioned to succeed on their 
own, or to act as network intermediaries on behalf of other businesses, by linking them into already-
established business networks or matching clients to foreign contacts (Rauch, 2001; Rauch and 
Watson, 2004). James Rauch explains that businesses are more likely to succeed in international 
markets if they gain introduction through an intermediary that has experience in the host country. 
Such intermediaries could include programs through consulates, NGOs and international trade 
organizations, existing international businesses, or even specialized service providers who are 
intimately familiar with the local laws, customs, and political systems.  
If structural holes increase or expand, casual and instrumental cross-border contacts can also be 
expected to decline. On the level of the firm, this could mean lost opportunities, lost contracts and 
decreased growth potential. From a regional economic development perspective, the competitive 
ability of a well-connected cross-border region to attract investment is conceptually stronger than 
that of two distinct and separate neighboring regions. The attractiveness of cross-border regions for 
investment could decline in the context of widening structural holes and damaged networks.  
For SMEs located in cross-border regions, cross-border access may require firms to bridge 
knowledge gaps. One way to bridge these gaps is to seek the assistance of customs brokers, 
transportation and logistics providers, and specialized professional and legal services specifically 
geared toward cross-border governance and trade.  
While the presence of an international border in a community certainly represents a ‗literal‘ political 
border, other border-types have been explored in urban and regional economic development circles. 
Women- and minority-owned businesses, for example, are often found to have less access to diverse 
networks relative to their peers. Institutions such as chambers of commerce, industrial development 
agencies and entrepreneurial programs, and a variety of professional services can be instrumental in 
bridging structural holes between networks(see McLean and Vance, 2002).   
                                                 
6 In the context of global trade scholarship, and over the past few decades, there has been a relative decline in the costs 
of transportation services and a decline in the quantity and intensity of tariffs. These have not disappeared, however (See 
Dicken 2003 for an overview). In the contemporary North American context, issues such as rising transportation costs 




Little is known about the extent to which local, community-focused network intermediary 
organizations extend across international borders. A strong presence of border-crossing initiatives 
by highly-localized business networks would imply a highly interconnected and cohesive cross-
border region. 
International intermediaries described by Rauch and local intermediaries described by McLean and 
Vance (2002) share many similarities. Both facilitate formal and informal connections between 
clients, through individual introductions, network memberships, or specialized services. Cross-
border regions such as those straddling the Canada-U.S. border clearly play host to both 
international and local network intermediaries. However, the nature of membership rosters and 
services offered by intermediaries within cross-border regions may help reveal some critical 
information about the nature of the border as a structural hole (i.e., what specific difficulties are the 
most prevalent?), and may offer some insight about how businesses located in cross-border regions 
use network intermediaries as part of their cross-border access strategies.  
Furthermore, a study that includes intermediaries that facilitate international trade as well as those 
that specialize in local economic development efforts will help to create a characterization of the 
nature of local cross-border networking. Are cross-border regions better characterized as proximate 
international markets (where the border is a prominent feature), or are they cohesive business 
communities that happen to straddle an international border? The nature of cross-border linkages, 
firm level strategies and roles of intermediaries may offer a more accurate representation of two 
Canada – U.S. cross-border regions.  
Geography 
Two key cross-border regions were identified for the purposes of this project. The Niagara and 
Cascadia Gateway regions represent the second and third largest trade and traffic corridors between 
Canada and the U.S. respectively. To date, most contemporary borderlands studies in North 
America have focused on one region at a time. This study incorporates two regions in an attempt to 
capture the similarities and differences of the effects of national-level border policies on different 
communities. A comparative study can shed light on best practices within the two regions, while 
highlighting region-specific challenges and assets rather than implying a one-size-fits-all vision. 
For the purposes of this study, the Niagara Gateway region is defined as the Niagara Peninsula in 
southern Ontario, and Erie and Niagara counties in western New York. The twin cities of Niagara 
Falls, ON, and Niagara Falls, NY, as well as Buffalo, NY, lie within the region, and Hamilton, ON, 
marks the westernmost extent of the region. The Niagara River, which connects Lake Erie and Lake 
Ontario, bisects the region and coincides with the international border. Four international bridges 
cross the Niagara River, connecting the region. The Peace Bridge between Fort Erie, ON, and 
Buffalo, NY, and the Queenston-Lewiston Bridge connecting Queenston, ON, and Lewiston, NY, 
are the two most prominent crossings. They are open to both commercial and passenger traffic. The 
Rainbow Bridge, connecting the twin cities of Niagara Falls, ON, and Niagara Falls, NY, is open to 
passenger and bus traffic only, and the Whirlpool Bridge is exclusively for use by NEXUS pass 
holders. 
The Niagara Gateway region is a diverse economic region, whose industrial bread-and-butter was 
historically heavy manufacturing industries such as steel, automotive and automotive parts. The U.S. 
portion of this region in particular has been negatively impacted by large-scale disinvestments by 
prominent manufacturers in the second half of the 20th century. JIT supply chains for commodities 




also provided the platform for a strong tourism base. Nearby, Toronto has contributed to the 
growth of information, services, and high-tech industries as well. The manufacturing legacy that 
characterizes both sides of the border in the Niagara Gateway region is of particular interest, as 
cross-border JIT systems are conceptually particularly vulnerable to delays and hiccups in the border 
crossing process.  
For the purposes of this study, the Cascadia Gateway region is defined as the Lower Mainland, BC, 
and Whatcom County, WA. Vancouver, BC, and Bellingham, WA, are two prominent cities that lie 
within this region. The Cascadia Gateway region is geographically constrained to the east by the 
presence of the Cascade and Coast Range Mountains, and to the west by Puget Sound and the 
Georgia Basin.  
The Cascadia Gateway region represents the third largest cluster of crossings between the U.S. and 
Canada in terms of volume. Five border-crossing points are contained within the region. The Peace 
Arch and Pacific Highway crossings are located within 1km of each other along the shore of Puget 
Sound to the south and Georgia Basin to the north. They accommodate the greatest volumes of 
commercial and passenger traffic within the region. The Lynden-Aldergrove and the Sumas-
Huntingdon crossings are located inland. The fifth crossing provides access to and from Point 
Roberts, WA, a community that is located south of the 49th parallel, on a peninsula that extends 
from BC‘s Lower Mainland.  
An industrial profile of the Cascadia Gateway region includes some considerable differences from 
that of the Niagara Gateway region. Structural differences between the two regions include 
production activities that are more oriented toward finished products, rather than the signature 
highly-intertwined cross-border supply chains found in the Great Lakes. This implies that JIT 
manufacturing is less of a concern. Furthermore, cross-border shipments in the Cascadia region are 
more likely to be partial or ―less than load (LTL)‖ shipments. Cross-border traffic on the west coast 
is also more closely intertwined with a north-south string of Pacific seaports in Canada and the U.S. 
Ports up and down the west coast compete with each other for international business. Containers 
are loaded and unloaded, and goods are transported throughout the continent by tractor trailer and 
rail. The transport of finished goods to and from ports may be less time sensitive than the JIT 
networks in the Great Lakes.  
Despite their differences, both regions face theoretically identical regulatory environments at the 
border, as border regulations (and other rules regarding the transport and import of goods) are 
written at the national level. Goldfarb and Robson (2003) note that industries have been impacted 
by changing border regulations and conditions differently. If the industrial mix and social contexts 
of two distant cross-border regions differ, the impacts of border policies are likely to differ as well.  
Research Focus 
The focus of this study is twofold, seeking to enhance knowledge about: (1) perceptions of changing 
border regulations and conditions by borderland-located businesses, and the strategies that they use 
to thrive in an environment of perceived difficulties; and (2) social network structures that exist 
within the two borderland study regions—primarily those that touch the business communities 
within the respective cross-border regions. A two-tiered inquiry involved mailed surveys and face-to-







Surveys were distributed to known importing and exporting businesses in the two study areas. The 
surveys asked questions pertaining to perceptions of the border over time and inquired about the 
nature of strategies considered and pursued in light of shifting border conditions.  
In-depth interviews were conducted with individuals who serve in some capacity as structural 
bridges or network intermediaries, usually at a local scale. Intermediaries were asked to identify 
challenges faced by their clients or members, or in their personal travels, and how they address these 
challenges.  
By understanding the challenges (i.e. the structural holes) perceived by businesses and network 
intermediaries as they relate to international border passage, better connections may be possible 
within the study regions. A description of best practices also lends itself to improved cross-border 
communications and systems of governance, as well as the exposure and promotion of best 
practices for navigating a shifting policy environment.  
Surveys 
Surveys were distributed in early 2009 to business managers of known importing and exporting 
firms throughout the two gateway regions described above. 69 were returned for analysis.7 66 
completed surveys were received from businesses located in the Cascadia Gateway region (34 from 
the Lower Mainland, BC, and 32 from Whatcom County). Three were returned from firms in 
Southern Ontario in the Niagara Gateway region.8 
Survey participants from both sides of the border tended to be small businesses, characterized as 
employing 50 or fewer people (46, or 72 percent, of all responding businesses fit this size 
classification), and tended to describe the functions of their regional facilities as either headquarters 
(58 percent of total) and/or manufacturing facilities (59 percent of total).9 Survey participants 
represented, for the most part, goods-producing industries. In most cases, business owners were 
citizens of the same country where the reporting facility was located.  
One interesting (albeit not entirely unexpected) contrast to previous studies in the Niagara Gateway 
region (see MacPherson, et.al. 2006 and Vance, 2008a, 2008b) was that reporting firms were less 
likely to describe themselves as involved in JIT supply chains. 63 percent of all returned surveys 
indicated that they were not part of a JIT process.  
Although a vast majority of participating firms indicated involvement in importing goods or services 
across the border, Lower Mainland-located firms in the Cascadia Gateway were more likely than 
their Whatcom County counterparts to indicate involvement in importing activities (30, or 91 
percent, compared to 23, or 74 percent, respectively). Slightly more than 50 percent of all imports 
originated within 100 miles or 160 km of the Cascadia Gateway border crossings. Since 2001, the 
mix of cross-border imports is reported to have decreased or remained unchanged by a significant 
number of participants (16, or 30 percent, and 25, or 47 percent, respectively). While unchanged was 
the most common response for both regions, participants in British Columbia were more likely than 
                                                 
7 Due to the small number of participants, the sample is assumed not to be statistically significant. Straightforward 
counts and qualitative content are included for reference. 
8 For the purposes of this study, survey responses are only assumed to characterize perceptions of Cascadia Gateway 
participants due to the response rate. Questions pertaining to firm level perceptions of the Niagara Gateway region were 
obtained from previous research specific to the Niagara Gateway region. See MacPherson, et.al. (2006) and Vance 
(2008a, 2008b) for more information. 




their Washington counterparts to indicate decreased importing activity. Not surprisingly, the vast 
majority of cross-border imports were delivered by truck.  
84 percent of all survey participants exported goods or services across the Canada-U.S. border. 
Proportions were similar for both Lower Mainland and Whatcom County participants. However, 
participants in British Columbia were far more likely than their counterparts in Washington to be 
heavily reliant on exports. The average percent of total business transactions that was dependent on 
cross-border sales was 48 percent for British Columbian firms and only 9 percent for firms in 
Whatcom County. Over the past decade, an equal proportion of export-intensive British Columbian 
firms were likely to report either unchanged or decreased cross-border exports (11, or 37 percent, each 
response). Washington firms were most likely to report unchanged (13, or 57 percent), or increased 
exports (7, or 30 percent). Cross-border exports were most likely to be delivered by truck (80 
percent for each side), and Washington exports to British Columbia were far more likely to remain 
local (average 55 percent, median 60 percent) than exports that originated in British Columbia 
(average 24 percent, median 10 percent).  
A sample copy of a cover letter and survey instrument is provided in Appendix A at the conclusion 
of this report.  
Interviews 
The second research methodology selected for this project involves the use of semi-structured 
interviews with people in organizations and firms that are likely to serve intermediary roles in cross-
border supply chains within the chosen study regions.  
Network intermediaries were asked questions pertaining to the nature of the specific services they 
provide to clients and members, strategic trends they have witnessed among small businesses, and 
the difficulties (and opportunities) that they have encountered in the course of their border-crossing 
/ network-bridging services.  
In recent years, a greater amount of attention has been paid to the topic of active engagement of the 
public, private and academic sectors within cross-border regions. Shared interests such as the health 
of the physical environment, regional economic vitality and competitiveness, and transportation-
related concerns have led to increased dialog and interest in local cross-border governance 
structures. (See PRI (2008) and BPRI/UBRI (2009) for a sample list of regional organizations that 
address cross-border issues). These publications provided compilations of initial contacts with such 
organizations that fill roles whereby they facilitate active cross-border dialog and collaborative 
efforts. 
A second set of intermediaries targeted for this study included local economic development officers. 
Economic development interests assume a variety of forms, governance structures and sectors 
including economic development agencies and local chambers of commerce. Organizations and 
individuals were identified by word-of-mouth and through internet searches. This second set of 
intermediaries was selected due to their local orientation. Cross-border networks are expected to be 
local in nature. 
A third set of intermediaries came from the private sector, and included providers of specialized 
business services. Logistics (i.e., transportation and warehousing) firms, customs brokers, and 
specialized legal services fall under this category. Possible contacts within the private sector were 
identified at informational meetings within local business networks, through internet searches, and 
through personal contacts. Emerging strategies in this category are expected to reflect cross-border 




Firms and organizations were contacted during January, 2010, and most interviews took place in the 
final week of January and the first week of February. Whenever possible, on-site interviews were 
conducted in person, and recorded. In cases where face-to-face interviews were not possible, 
telephone interviews were conducted.  
In total, 29 individuals participated in semi-structured interviews. 16 intermediaries participated from 
the Niagara Gateway region and 13 interviewees represented the Cascadia Gateway region. A 
complete list of interview participants can be found in Appendix B at the conclusion of this report.  
Economic Downturn 
One of the difficulties associated with chasing moving targets is that they tend to be surrounded by 
multiple other moving targets. At the time that this report was being written, the U.S. and Canada 
were in the midst of a severe global economic downturn. At the time that surveys were distributed 
and interviews were taking place, a ―Buy American‖ policy (and reactive ―Buy Canadian‖ 
conversations) resulted in fear-driven rhetoric similar to the rhetoric that dominated the immediate 
post-9/11 period.  
Globerman and Storer (2009) point out that the economic downturn may actually be in part 
responsible for the illusion of a temporarily functional border. They reason that usage of border 
crossing points between Canada and the U.S. has not increased at the rate that would normally be 
expected. Current traffic volumes are therefore not representative of the traffic that would pass 
through during times of economic health or normalcy. If continental border crossings had to 
accommodate normal rather than current reduced volumes of cross-border trade, they argue, border 
delays and other impediments would be worse than they currently appear. By extension, economic 
recovery will reveal negative impacts. Economic decline, then, masks or postpones economic 
damage related to border impediments.   
Border Conditions: Firm Level Observations 
As discussed earlier in this paper, the regulatory, physical and social environments of the Canada – 
U.S. border have been in flux for much of the past decade. Studies shortly after 2001 posited that 
border regulatory shifts would have negative impacts on businesses in cross-border regions. To a 
certain extent this seems to have been the case, however interviews in the Niagara Gateway region in 
2006 revealed that firms in that region were well on the way to recovery (Vance 2008a, 2008b). 
Businesses had made strategic adjustments and the border conditions were less obtrusive for 
managers who had a better idea of what to expect as a function of time and experience with new 
protocols.  
Between the 2006 study and the survey distributed in 2009 a new piece of legislation went into 
effect. The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) constrained the range of acceptable 
identification for crossing into the U.S., possibly triggering another wave of obstacles for individuals 
and firms (particularly in the service sector) to overcome.  
Some of the most frequent comments regarding negative border crossing experiences in the afore-
mentioned studies had to do with efficiency, consistency and costs associated with cross-border 
travel or shipment. Survey participants were asked to rate their border crossing experiences for the 
following years: 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008.  
For the questions of efficiency and consistency, there was no strong consensus past 2002 about 
whether border conditions had improved, stayed the same, or gotten worse. For the most part, 




perceptual adjustment toward better or worse conditions over the time period in question. Few 
responses were returned identifying drastic perceptual changes between 2002 and 2008.  
For the question of cost, respondents, with a few exceptions, indicated either no change or an 
increase in the cost of doing cross-border business. In some cases the reported perceptual 
adjustments were drastic.  
In addition to descriptions that could be summed up as ―lines at the border‖ or ―long waits,‖ some 
responses described learning curves or specified where increased costs entered into the process.  
Some participants described different parts of the bureaucratic process. For one respondent, the 
problem was the regulations themselves: ―Since 2001 the bureaucratic requirements have increased 
unnecessarily as have the costs associated to meet those requirements.‖ Another participant focused 
on the institutional learning curve faced by government employees: ―With changing regulations, 
border officials have a learning curve to climb in implementing and enforcing. Also, knowledge is 
sometimes uneven among border officials.‖ One participant pointed out the learning curve that was 
taking place within the firm: ―Efficiency is fine, cost we can adapt to, inconsistency in interpreting 
legislation is hard to adapt to.‖  
Two respondents who indicated no change in terms of efficiency, consistency or cost (a response 
that was not at all uncommon) attributed their even-keeled border crossing experience to 
participation in voluntary compliance programs: ―Typical startup of FAST was impacting clearances. 
Today, FAST is efficient and seamless;‖ ―We are C-TPAT certified which does seem to make things 
easier.‖ 
Cost tended to be the single category that had the highest degree of consensus among survey 
participants—that being a sense that costs related to border crossing activities were rising. 
Participants attributed rising costs to increased wait time, taxes and permits, rising fuel prices, 
brokerage fees, customs fees, transportation costs, exchange rates, increased paperwork, and 
softwood duties.  
When asked whether changing border regulations had actually impacted businesses, the most 
frequent response was ―no change‖ for firms both in the Lower Mainland and Whatcom County. 
However, respondents were far more likely to respond that they had experienced ―negative‖ or 
―somewhat negative‖ changes than they were to report changes for the better. Participants in 
Whatcom County were far more likely to report that they experienced no setback as a consequence 
of border regulations than were Lower Mainland located firms that were somewhat divided on the 
matter.  
 
To what extent and in what way has your firm been impacted by post-9/11 border legislation (check one)
Response Responses Percent Responses Percent Responses Percent
Significant and Negative 12 18% 7 23% 4 13%
Negative 16 24% 6 19% 8 25%
Neutral 26 39% 13 42% 13 41%
Positive 2 3% 1 3% 1 3%
Significant and Positive 1 2% 1 3% 0 0%
Uncertain 9 14% 3 10% 6 19%
Total 66 31 32
Lower Mainland, BC Whatcom County, WATotal
 





Do you feel that your business suffered any setbacks as a consequence of changing border regulations?
Response Responses Percent Responses Percent Responses Percent
Yes 24 36% 14 42% 7 23%
No 39 58% 16 48% 23 74%
N.A. 4 6% 3 9% 1 3%
 no answer 2 1 1
Total 67 33 31
If yes, to what extent do you feel that your firm has recovered?
Completerecovery 4 17% 3 21% 1 17%
Partial recovery 16 70% 8 57% 5 83%
No recovery 3 13% 3 21% 0 0%
Total 23 14 6
Total Lower Mainland, BC Whatcom County, WA
 
      Table 2: Setbacks and Recovery of Cross-Border Businesses, Post 9/11 
 
This finding comes as little surprise, due to the asymmetrical nature of the Canadian and U.S. 
economies with respect to their dependence on each other, and due to the cross-border export 
orientation of the Canadian firms in this sample. When asked about their recovery, responding firms 
were mixed on the issue, and were most likely to respond that they had partially recovered from 
border related setbacks.  
Transportation costs were almost universally reported to have risen over the period in question, with 
an average reported increase of 29 percent since 2001.  
When asked about the important issues surrounding cross-border business, the overwhelming 
response focused not on border regulations, but rather the complementarities inherent in cross-
border regions that make them competitive and vulnerable, regardless of the regulatory details at one 
time or another. Because the border is a location where two national economies meet, businesses are 
able to take advantage not only of the local conditions of the borderland, but are able to take 
advantage of easy access to multiple national business environments. The exchange rate was 
regarded as the single most important issue by the majority of participants. This was followed by the 
economy at large (i.e., a deep global economic recession at the time of this study) and transportation 
costs. One survey respondent concisely described how some of the contemporary challenges all 
contributed to his firm‘s current situation. ―Security and regulatory expenses increased—as did time 
to process them. Export business to Canada stayed fairly consistent over this timeframe but fuel 
costs increased and the economic recession has affected all commerce.‖  
Border Conditions: Observations by Network Intermediaries 
Network intermediaries in both study regions (and on both sides of the international border) tended 
to identify their regions as locations of opportunity for business, recreation, local diversity and 
regional competitiveness. Border crossings, however, were generally regarded as potential 
constraints to residents and businesses for accessing the full gamut of regional opportunities. 
Similarly to many of the businesses who participated in surveys, discussions about the nature of 
border crossings revealed that the border represents a highly variable impediment and a potential 
black box for occasional and frequent crossers alike.  
Interviews with network liaisons in both gateway regions emphasized some of the differences 
between the business and regulatory environments across the political boundaries. Intermediaries 




the challenges. However, differences in approach and social infrastructure differed between the two 
study regions. Interviews in both regions revealed that directional social connections were plentiful. 
Mission and vision statements of service providers in the public and private sectors often revealed 
their orientation and commitment to export assistance or inward direct-investment / local economic 
development goals. However, the extent to which players in the Niagara and Cascadia Gateway 
regions bound their actions to these mission statements differed.  
Interview participants in the Niagara Gateway region emphasized goals and missions that coincided 
with jurisdictional boundaries at multiple scales. While each individual interviewed supported the 
idea of cross-border networks in both directions, most were limited by direction-specific mission 
statements and were constrained to specific jurisdictional boundaries. Actors on both sides of the 
border actively advertised their proximity to the border and accessibility to cross-border markets; 
however, their stated professional interests, actions, and efficacy were frequently ultimately defined 
by jurisdictional boundaries. The international border is one of many jurisdictional borders and 
defines some geographic legal and strategic parameters. One Niagara Gateway-area participant 
explained:  
―It bothered me a lot to hear comments (like) ‗You know, I don‘t really know who 
these economic development people (on the opposite side of the border) are‘…Why 
didn‘t anyone ever think to have those conversations? Why don‘t we know who each 
other are? We should be working together.‖    
Another participant went on to explain an environment of multi-scalar  inter-jurisdictional 
competition: 
―We are still (involved in) competitive old style industrial mentality turf wars. 
Historical industrial…territorialism. The fact (is) that we are still dealing with 12 
municipalities in Niagara and with all the villages and hamlets in western New York. 
People are slowly making changes happen, but it all comes down to cooperation and 
global competitiveness. If we don‘t fix these things we are out of the game.‖   
The same participant went on to explain that, at the time of the interview, people were beginning to 
talk and that fruitful strategic collaborations across borders are emerging in a meaningful and 
productive way. The participant also noted that such efforts in the Niagara Gateway region are being 
led by actors in the private sector.  
Mission statements of individual businesses and institutions in the Cascadia Gateway region also 
tend to be directional in nature. However, individuals and businesses who participated in this series 
of interviews seemed less likely to confine their activities and networks to pre-defined jurisdictions. 
Participants were more likely to describe cross-border business activities and networks. Explicit 
regional networks have formed that facilitate instrumental information gathering and referrals for 
cross-border business services.  
Professional networks were created as tools for businesses to grow through information provision 
and cooperative exchange of information and professional services. The competitive abilities of 
individuals and businesses in the Cascadia Gateway region seem to be linked to their abilities to 
cooperate and build service linkages, regardless of (but reinforced by) jurisdictional boundaries. A 
pattern that emerged from discussions with key Cascadian intermediaries was a region characterized 
by a network of professional referrals. Competitive advantage for professionals in this region lies in 




professionals working on specific tasks. This network arrangement supports the idea that the 
economy is viewed as a dynamic and evolving series of interpersonal interactions. 
Both regions are characterized both by the borders that constrain activities and by the bridges that 
can reduce the relative impact of those borders. The primary observed difference, based on this set 
of interviews, is that instrumental networking activities in the Cascadia Gateway region were easier 
to identify. They were also more likely to lead to explicit connections with professional business 
services, from the private sector to the private sector.  
During interviews, network intermediaries tended to echo several of the sentiments described above. 
Indeed, the theme of inconsistency at border crossings specifically emerged in nearly every interview 
conducted over the course of this research project. Laws and regulations continue to evolve within 
the halls of the Canadian and U.S. federal systems of government. Enforcement of sometimes 
conflicting goals (i.e., preservation of security, facilitation of trade, and generation of revenue) places 
undue pressure on government employees responsible for making critical decisions from  customs 
booths. Job turnover among government employees at border posts adds to inconsistent 
enforcement of laws due to overlapping individual learning curves. 
Businesses have adjusted to multiple regulatory changes over the past decade, but for reasons 
described above, the border had generally been regarded as an unpredictable zone by businesses as 
well as those people who were identified as experts in this realm. During the course of interviews, a 
number of anecdotal stories emerged about border inconsistencies that had caused problems at one 
time or another, and remain fresh in individuals‘ memories. In recent years, crossing the border has 
become a stressful process due to a high level of qualitative variability—even for those who cross 
routinely. The stress related to inconsistent information, information that is somehow difficult to 
obtain, or simply the stress that comes with a sense of powerlessness as one approaches the customs 
booth can be a powerful deterrent in the decision to make future cross-border trips regardless of the 
reason. Individual stress or anxiety can be a deeply damaging structural hole.  
Legally, international borders and ports of entry are considered the domain of federal governing 
bodies. Regulatory decisions affecting ports of entry are debated and decided in Ottawa and 
Washington D.C. This is not inherently problematic, but from the perspective of people, businesses 
and communities that have a high level of investment in their cross-border connections (and who 
often share greater cultural similarities with each other than with compatriots at geographically 
distant capitals) there is a high level of frustration that stems from a perception that federal 
lawmakers are unfamiliar with the border in practical terms. There is frustration that regulatory 
changes do not take into consideration the culture or functions of borderland communities, the 
needs of local border stakeholders, or appreciate local impacts of border reforms. Although most 
individuals interviewed expressed empathy that regulations were necessary and/or enforced 
reasonably in most instances, interviewees relayed a number of stories about negative or unintended 
impacts of regulatory changes. Frustrations are particularly evident in the Cascadia Gateway region.  
One participant observed that, despite the contemporary political rhetoric of ‗security and trade‘ 
promoted by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), political dialog continues to defend the 
notion that the two goals remain at odds. This is not necessarily because technologies cannot speed 
up border crossing processes (this has been the dominant strategy), but because of the need for an 
element of surprise. In order for a border to facilitate trade, it must be predictable. However, in 
order for a border to catch creative criminal elements, border processes must be unpredictable. One 




―From a security perspective, unpredictability is exactly what you want. You don‘t 
want it to be predictable, ‗cause otherwise the bad guys are going to figure it out…So 
you have these two opposite…imperatives working against each other. For business 
the most important thing is predictability. For security, it‘s unpredictability. And so 
how do you mesh those two things? They‘re really contradictory.‖ 
 
How do agencies charged with the enforcement of multiple imperatives (as well as enforcement of 
countless other agencies‘ regulations) prioritize and achieve increasingly diverse lists of objectives? 
The technological interface at the border has become more intricate, but processing times have 
increased. In the case of the United States, CBP falls under the umbrella of the Department of 
Homeland Security: structurally, the dominant imperative of the agency is related to security, and 
therefore requires a certain level of unpredictability.  
Early publications emphasized challenges related to inconsistency of wait times and the potential for 
long or variable border waits to negatively impact JIT systems that rely on temporal predictability. In 
2010, the problematic inconsistencies described in interviews were for the most part not focused on 
wait times. Rather, uncertainty was discussed in terms of shifting regulatory targets and 
unpredictability of how regulations would be interpreted at the moment of face-to-face contact at 
the customs booth.  
Interviewees in both gateway regions described ambiguity of regulation as problematic for casual 
travelers, who had difficulty accessing the information in the first place, as well as for frequent 
business travelers who were caught off guard by a new regulation or a new interpretation of existing 
laws. Multiple scenarios were described during the course of interviews. Inconsistency is a persisting 
problem across geography and over time. (See Vance et.al., 2004; Vance, 2008a; 2008b).  
Several interview participants also pointed out that the problem of inconsistent enforcement of 
border regulations is further compounded by a lack of known formal or informal appeals processes.  
Strategies: Businesses 
MacPherson et.al. (2006) and Vance (2008a, 2008b) found that businesses in the Niagara Gateway 
region were strategically motivated in different manners depending on the side of the border in 
which they were located. In short, U.S. located businesses were more inclined than their Canadian 
counterparts to consider strategies of disinvestment from existing cross-border suppliers in favor of 
U.S. suppliers, if the border had become a large impediment. In stark contrast, Canadian firms 
expressed interest in pursuing a variety of strategies including facility relocation or investment, trade 
diversion and transportation strategies.  
One key strategy used among Niagara firms involved simply subcontracting transportation and 
customs services to third party providers. Survey participants from the Cascadian Gateway region 
overwhelmingly echoed this strategy. 
When asked to outline other strategies that had been used or considered, two interesting trends 
surfaced: (1) Only a handful of firms responded to this portion of the survey, possibly indicating 
that they had not or were not considering any strategic changes as a result of changing border 
regulations. It may simply be the case that impediments present at the border are not significant 
enough to warrant conscious strategic adjustments above and beyond filling out more paperwork or 
absorbing increasing costs. (2) Canadian firms, as in the Niagara studies, were more likely to respond 




continued success of their business in a cross-border setting. This is not a surprising finding given 
the asymmetrical trade relationships between the two countries.  
The most common strategies identified by Canadian and U.S. firms alike had to do with augmenting 
warehoused inventories. Eighteen firms from the Lower Mainland indicated that they had already 
made some shifts involving increases of warehoused stock, and sixteen were considering 
warehoused increases as a possible future strategy. In other words, Canadian firms were interested in 
moving toward a Just-in-Case supply model that incurs additional costs to house inventories, but 
ensures availability and can therefore reduce some risks, such as late delivery or temporary halts to 
the manufacturing process. Another dimension to this decision is that it can, in the words of one 
participant ―decrease (the) number of shipments‖ that have to be made across the border. If the 
border is a variable or risky environment, a strategy that involves infrequent crossing reduces risk. 
This is consistent with findings from Goldfarb (2007b) as well as with findings from Niagara 
Gateway studies. Although U.S. firms were less likely to pursue this strategy, it still remained as one 
of the most commonly referenced strategies for Whatcom County firms. U.S. firms were more likely 
to consider warehouse strategies involving the reduction of warehoused stock. In fact, this was the 
most frequently referenced strategy for Whatcom County participants. This was also a common 
strategy on the Canadian side of the border.  
A closely related strategy often pursued by Canadian firms was a strategy of purchasing, expanding 
or renting additional facilities. Sixteen Canadian respondents indicated pursuit of this strategy, 
particularly for the establishment or expansion of warehouse facilities to house larger stocks.  
Other frequently referenced options included expansion of overseas markets, replacement of cross-
border suppliers with same-side suppliers and expansion of domestic sales.  
Indeed, many of these strategies are tightly inter-related and subject to forces beyond the immediate 
conditions of existing supply chains or regulatory frameworks. Considerations such as the nature of 
the product can make a difference as to which backward linkages or end markets make sense. For 
some, cost reduction drove the primary strategic decisions, as represented by the following 
responses: ―Any available Canadian supplier to avoid cross-border delays and costs‖ and ―depends 
on exchange, quality and price.‖ One respondent indicated that ―diversification of markets is 
required: (We) can‘t depend on (the) U.S. economy all the time. Although the U.S. is our closest 





Strategies pursued or considered by borderland-located businesses
Response Pursued Considering Pursued Considering
Increase warehoused stock 18 16 8 7
Decrease warehoused stock 14 12 16 6
Purchase, expand, or rent 
additional facilities
16 13 7 7
Disinvest from existing 
facilities
13 12 7 7
Enroll in government programs 
such as C-TPAT, FAST or PIP
12 9 6 6
Replace (cross border) 
suppliers with (same side) 
suppliers
14 6 6 1
Replace (same side) suppliers 
with (cross border) suppliers
12 10 7 6
Change price structure 14 11 6 6
Choose alternate 
transportation routes
13 8 6 6
Choose alternate 
transportation modes
11 8 7 7
Subcontract transportation 
services
10 7 8 6
Increase overseas sourcing 13 12 6 6
Relocate overseas facilities to 
North America
9 6 5 5
Expand overseas markets 17 15 6 6
Focus on North American 
markets
9 7 7 6
Expand domestic sales 14 11 7 7
Join trade organization or 
chamber of commerce
9 7 6 6
Other (please explain) 2 0 2 1
Lower Mainland, BC Whatcom County, WA
 
 Table 3: Strategies Pursued by Borderland-Located Businesses 
Strategies: Network Intermediaries 
Movement of Material Goods 
The movement of material goods across the Canada – U.S. border is vital to the strength of North 
American integrated economic structures—but it is important to recognize that the act of 
transporting goods across the border represents only a portion of the administrative and logistical 




Fundamentally, the production, movement and sales of goods and services are built on the ideas, 
strategies, and movements of people. Cross-border shipments of material goods by truck, for 
example, involve interactions between customs agents and drivers; installation, maintenance and 
repair activities often require cross-border movement of technicians; the generation of innovative 
ideas upstream or sales downstream frequently involves face-to-face meetings; and industries that 
are customer-driven and spatially fixed (such as retail, tourism, education and health care) rely on 
easy cross-border access by customers. Furthermore, in an integrated cross-border economy, labor 
pools—not just customers—often extend across the international line of demarcation.  
Generally speaking, cross-border transport of physical products was not at the forefront of interview 
participants‘ concerns. Participants described standardization of goods and processes. They 
explained that rules and regulations governing the movement of physical goods are reasonably 
straightforward. They acknowledged that paperwork had increased, but were quick to note that 
paperwork was generally straightforward and consistent. As long as manufacturers are familiar with 
their product, and take the necessary steps to ensure consistency of product and of regulatory 
compliance, participants argued, manufacturers have little excuse. In the words of one Cascadia 
Gateway participant: 
―We‘re professionals. Tell us what we need to do. We‘ll do it. And, if it‘s a long list 
of things we have to do, as long as it‘s clear and they don‘t change,… Predictability is 
what it all boils down to. And I think that‘s one thing that any professional—and in 
life generally—in the professions you‘ve got to have predictability.‖  
In terms of the transport of goods, customs was described as an extension of the general regulatory 
environment, and simply a matter-of-fact in a broader context of international trade. Common 
strategies described by interview participants (and the advice they provide for clients where 
applicable) involved strategies of preparedness—namely, being familiar with rules and regulations, 
and hiring third party experts (i.e., logistics and customs providers) to handle those parts of the 
process that were not the businesses‘ proclaimed core competencies. These observations are 
consistent with findings from previous studies (Goldfarb 2007a; 2007b; Vance 2008a; 2008b). 
Interview participants explained that federal border regulations are changeable from the top-down, 
but largely immovable without federal government mandate. Regulatory aspects of the border were 
generally regarded as a hurdle to be overcome through information gathering and adherence to 
regulations. The top-down model of governance and impact of policy was evident, and the 
responsibility to ensure passage of goods was that of the firm.  
―If you‘re going to be going (across the border), it‘s your responsibility to find out 
what the rules of the road are. You can‘t go down to the border unprepared and then 
complain you ran into a problem…. On the whole, I think that when people prepare 
themselves to start with, then at least they have a right to complain. But if they‘re 
unprepared or ignorant and unprepared then, you know, go and prepare yourself!‖ 
explained one participant.  
With respect to uncertainty at border crossings, material goods are relatively safe and easier to 
standardize in terms of paperwork, processes and general identification. People, however, can 
present a problem. Simply stated, people are more dynamic than goods. They cannot be 
standardized and therefore pose a greater potential security challenge. Maintaining an element of 
surprise is in the interest of an agency whose primary mandate is to maintain national security by 




Movement of People 
Almost without exception, network intermediaries shifted the topic of conversation from the cross-
border movement of material goods to the cross-border movement of people. In the Niagara 
Gateway region, the discussion often shifted toward concerns in the local tourism and hospitality 
industries, while in the Cascadia Gateway region, a clear emphasis was placed on the cross-border 
movement of professionals.   
In a broader context, it is worth noting that the North American system is increasingly reliant on a 
service-oriented economy. It could be argued that the potential costs associated with hindering the 
movement of people and information exceed negative externalities related to delayed or inconsistent 
movement of material goods. High value and cutting edge industries rely on interpersonal 
interactions to facilitate generation of innovative ideas, products and processes, and to offer quality 
customer service.  
The regulatory environment of the Canada – U.S. border, as it stands today, and as it was defined 
under NAFTA, is inherently better equipped to accommodate the movement of material goods than 
of people. This is extremely problematic if high value industries (and high value elements of supply 
chains) rely on interpersonal interaction.  
Tourism and the Cross-Border Movement of People 
In the Niagara Gateway region (and to a lesser extent—as the Olympic Games approached—in the 
Cascadia Gateway region) concerns about passenger traffic were at the forefront of discussion. The 
Niagara Gateway region relies to a great extent on the revenue from the tourism and hospitality 
industries centered around Niagara Falls.  
Passage of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (also referred to as WHTI or the ‗passport 
law‘) by the U.S. government created confusion about acceptable documentation for entry into the 
United States. For the tourism-dependent Niagara Gateway region, WHTI has been particularly 
damaging, according to survey participants. The introduction of new travel document requirements 
has arguably made bi-national Niagara Falls a less competitive destination compared to other U.S.-
located tourism destinations, as well as in comparison to competing international tourism 
destinations. Potential tourists must obtain a passport or other valid form of identification in order 
to experience the bi-national attraction to its fullest—a potentially expensive and time consuming 
process. However, spontaneous travel was of greater concern. Spontaneous travel can easily be 
thwarted based on group composition. Each traveler in a party must have appropriate travel 
documents. One Ontario-based participant explained:  
―There are three forms of identification that we‘re aware of: passports, enhanced 
drivers licenses and the NEXUS pass. All of those items kind of hinder the 
impulsiveness of the potential traveler, and also hinder the convenience of that 
traveler. At some point there was a discussion about cost. I‘m not so sure that it has 
to do with the cost associated with acquiring those items. I just literally think that 
people don‘t bother to be processed. And in the decision making process of the plan 
to come visit a cross-border destination, their party composition doesn‘t always have 
all these credentials in place. Rather than for them to mitigate that, they just avoid 
the destination altogether. And rather than propose the idea to friends and family 
and have a few people left out because they don‘t have the appropriate credentials 
with the time frame of travel that they have in mind. To me, that‘s the most 




Furthermore, casual or infrequent cross-border consumers are less familiar with border crossing 
protocols and more likely to be swayed by negative messages delivered by the media, word of 
mouth, or memory.  
When discussing the movement of goods, participants made the case that businesses and business 
travelers must take on the responsibility of knowing regulations in advance of their arrival at the 
border. In the tourism and hospitality industries, the locus of responsibility is less clear. Is the 
knowledge about border regulations the responsibility of the individual traveler, the government 
entities at the border, or businesses in the tourism and hospitality industry? 
Official government websites and public service announcements make the case that travelers should 
‗know before you go‘ and, indeed, information is available. However, more than one intermediary 
made the case that information can be difficult to obtain, particularly for infrequent travelers or 
those without computer access.  
Furthermore, casual travelers have less incentive to repeat cross-border travel if their experience of 
the border is cumbersome or negative. For the casual cross-border consumer, a regulatory learning 
curve likely begins and ends with a single trip.  
The primary border-related challenge for the tourism industry is that of delivering accurate, up to 
date and reliable information to potential tourists about both the destination and the process 
necessary to ensure access to the destination. Information, interviewees explained, is out there, but 
can be difficult to track down. Furthermore, since enforcement can be irregular, even well-prepared 
individuals can find themselves waiting in a long queue or facing a series of intimidating questions.  
If numbers tell a story, for the Niagara Gateway region, the story involves longer average waiting 
and processing times, and smaller queues of passenger traffic. Across the board, participants who 
were familiar with or vested in the regional tourism industry observed this pattern and expressed 
concern that their regional competitive capability was being compromised by conditions at the 
border that amount to a deterring force overall. 
Cross-Border Movement of Professionals 
The cross-border movement of professionals was also of great concern, particularly in the Cascadia 
Gateway region. A number of anecdotes emerged during the course of interviews that emphasized 
the notion that even well prepared individuals can face challenges related to uncertainty and 
inconsistency at the border.  
―Your first point of contact can often be your last point of contact. That individual 
has enough power to be able to block you from going into the country ever again.‖  
Situations such as these, incidentally, are the types of situations where intermediaries 
frequently become involved in the process—i.e., after a problem has already occurred. The 
challenge, they all explained, was frequently a combination of insufficient research on the 








Increased technological and information requirements have led to a shift in the nature of 
enforcement. Interview participants in both cross-border regions remarked that enforcement of laws 
that existed prior to 2001 has changed. In a way, the border has become more consistent in the 
sense that enforcement has become more universal. One Cascadia gateway participant explained: 
―…stricter U.S. Customs rules. You know, just a buildup of personnel, obviously, 
and stricter U.S. customs rules that apply not only to new legislation and new rules, 
but actually a reinterpretation of the old rules as well.‖ 
While this doesn‘t in itself present a problem, it does make it more likely that cross-border travelers 
and shipments are delayed at the border because of regulations they had been unaware of because 
they had never been enforced.  
The issue of enforcement is particularly important in the context of the movement of people across 
the border. Increased standardization and enforcement of immigration requirements creates an 
uncertain environment for people who had been accustomed to crossing the border without 
consequence. Anecdotal accounts were given of professionals that legitimately crossed the border, 
but were stopped because their job categories were fluid or somehow not understood by customs 
agents as able to fit into a predetermined NAFTA-approved professional category. One participant 
explained: 
―Often when we think of business we are drawn to commodity flows (trucks and 
stuff like that) but I think in terms of the (professional) service sector. The border in 
some way presents even more difficult problems because it‘s that sector that seems 
to be sort of in the cracks…(For example), what is the purpose of a laptop? And 
what is a consultant?.... and maybe it is that anything you do that provides a service 
on the other side of the border that involves a fee, but sometimes there is even a 
gray area with that—whether you are really getting a fee, or how you‘re getting paid. 
What are the tax laws? It‘s just a complicated area.‖ 
(On a related note, during the course of a routine entry interview as I passed through the border, a 
border custodian explained that she routinely catches people who are not in compliance with 
regulations. She added that the job has taught her that most people are good, and that their minor 
legal missteps are generally unintentional.) 
The advice most frequently relayed by interview participants was for businesses interested in 
establishing themselves in a cross-border expansion (or working to stay afloat in a difficult 
economy and changing regulatory environment) to simply be well informed about 
regulations, and to seek professional advice when regulations are not clear cut. Of course, 
each individual interviewed acknowledged that uncertainty at the border is a major problem 
for cross-border business travelers. Ultimately, their goal is to reduce the likelihood that the 
uncertain border will be a problem for their clients. 
Additional advice offered by the border experts interviewed involved expansion of business 
networks and outsourcing responsibilities that are not core to the firm. Interview 
participants in both regions also emphasized the value of government-sponsored voluntary 






Workshops and Networking Sessions 
In both study regions, seminars and workshops are hosted to help disseminate basic information 
about rules and regulations, voluntary compliance programs and the like. Programs tend to be 
targeted to origin-specific audiences, and offer opportunities for participants to network with each 
other and with hosting organizations and companies. A number of network intermediaries are 
involved in hosting these seminars and workshops, which provides the intermediaries with potential 
business, and provides participants with contacts that can be helpful through the cross-border 
network building process. In the Cascadia Gateway region, such seminars are a frequent occurrence, 
particularly with an orientation toward a British Columbian business community.  
Voluntary Compliance Programs 
In addition to frequent suggestions of general preparedness, intermediaries were highly supportive 
of strategies of enrollment in government-sponsored ‗trusted traveler‘ programs such as C-TPAT, 
FAST, PIP and NEXUS. Most people interviewed carried NEXUS cards. Across the board, 
participants praised the programs and explained that they are a good, if partial, solution. Generally 
speaking, programs operate on the theory that the process of obtaining trusted traveler status 
reduces uncertainty for the governments. In exchange, enrollees‘ uncertainties can be reduced as 
they are expedited through the border crossing process.  
In practice, interviewees generally found voluntary compliance programs to deliver what they 
promise. However, concerns over inconsistent enforcement continued to arise. Several interview 
participants in both regions explained that the inconsistent enforcement has occasionally backfired 
on trusted travelers due to perceived gaps in training for customs officials and a lack of a formal 
appeals process for confiscation of NEXUS and FAST cards.10  
Interviewees explained that voluntary compliance programs were not ‗one size fits all‘ in nature. 
Programs such as FAST are more likely to facilitate cross-border business in some regions and for 
some industries than for others. One participant in the Cascadia Gateway region explained: 
―We don‘t have integrated manufacturing here as much as the east coast. So, 
companies here don‘t really seem to care if their carriers are FAST or not. 
Carriers want the benefits of avoiding congestion or not paying drivers for as 
many hours or saving on fuel costs or whatever, but they don‘t really have 
any leverage on their shipper customers. Whereas on the east coast, where 
there is more integrated manufacturing, it‘s actually the shippers—the 
manufacturers—that are requiring their carriers to be in the FAST 
program….The push for complying with those new regulations starts at the 
origin of the trade flow—with manufacturers themselves.‖  
In short, geography matters, and enrollment in government-sponsored voluntary compliance 
programs can be a viable strategy for businesses in some regions or industries, but not in others.  
 
 
                                                 




The Nature of the Cross-Border Region  
During the interview process, one conceptual question was raised for discussion. ―Reflecting on this 
region, do you tend to think of it more as two adjacent communities (i.e., separate, but with many 
connections) or as more of a singular community that has to deal with an international border?‖ 
Although the question is highly conceptual in nature, it lends itself to a better picture of how cross-
border network intermediaries viewed their region and their place in it. Some conceptual differences 
about the border emerged between participants in the Cascadia Gateway region and those in the 
Niagara Gateway region.  
Residents of the Niagara Gateway region were more likely to respond that the two regions were 
adjacent but separate. They explained that day-to-day activities for area residents tend to be confined 
to one side of the border or the other.  
Two different types of stories unfolded and supported this argument: personal anecdotes of 
changing border-crossing practices supported the notion of recent government–driven fragmentation; 
and business and governance-focused anecdotes painted a picture of a long-standing fragmented 
regional system.  
While many businesses do take advantages of proximity to the border, successful businesses treat 
the international border as a dividing line between two separate and distinct markets. Digging deeper 
into the explanation revealed a detailed discussion about the scales of governance—with a particular 
emphasis on the different scalar emphases between governance in New York State and the province 
of Ontario. In short, stories gleaned through this process exposed challenges associated with 
navigating multiple jurisdictional and regulatory borders in addition to the primary international 
border at the heart of this inquiry. 
Niagara Gateway participants were also more likely to point out the differences of the legal, 
regulatory, and business environments both between the two Niagaras and within. At the local level, 
lines that divide municipalities and counties were described as strong, and an impediment to regional 
cooperation at all levels. This particularly seemed to be the case in Niagara, ON. Several interviews 
touched upon the idea that municipal governing bodies operated in a highly competitive way that 
hindered regional, let alone international cooperative efforts.  
At the scale of the province or state, a similar story emerged. Participants described Ontario‘s 
comprehensive planning initiatives related to transportation infrastructure and ―Green Belts‖ in the 
provincially-defined ―Golden Horseshoe Region.‖ Participants advocating cross-border 
coordination expressed concerns that these planning initiatives would directly affect the cross-
border communities in New York—for better or for worse—but that New York had no such plans, 
and needed to engage in the planning process. 
A few Niagara Gateway participants described the contemporary region as a unified bi-national 
entity, but they were in a minority. Examples of ‗one region‘ arguments frequently emphasized the 
nature of the cross-border Niagara Falls tourism, as well as structural integration in the 
manufacturing sector. More often than not, a description of declining levels of routine interaction 
dominated discussions.  
Regardless of scale, it was evident that Niagara-area residents were oriented toward and limited by 
jurisdictional boundaries at all scales of governance. Political borders at the level of the municipality 




creation of a cohesive regional identity. Competitive relationships were characteristic of the 
landscape as described in a number of interviews.  
With a clear orientation toward the waterfront border, part of the reality that Niagara area residents 
face is the daily visual reminder that they live in a region that, for many, feels like a region only 
recently divided.  
Participants in the Cascadia Gateway region were more likely than their Niagara Gateway area peers 
to respond that the Cascadia Gateway region is one region. Explanations tended to focus on scales 
and definitions that differed from jurisdictional boundaries. Participants frequently described 
Cascadia in terms of a shared physical environment. At the local level, some described the region as 
the Fraser River Valley; while at a larger scale, environmentally-focused participants described an 
economic and social corridor flanked by the Pacific Ocean and the Cascade Mountains. In both 
cases, a very distinct cultural orientation toward environmental awareness was made apparent. When 
political boundaries were used to describe the Cascadia region, the PNWER coalition was often 
described.11   
In the Cascadian geography that is often described in terms of corridors and flows, a hardened 
border seemed antithetical and artificial.  
In contrast to Niagara area accounts, Cascadian descriptions of the border seldom described 
‗spontaneous‘ cross-border travel. Due to the distances between dominant urban centers, cross-
border travel in the region has often taken on a deliberate character—whether it be a daily commute 
or business travel or a cross-border shopping spree.  
Conclusion 
The first decade of the 21st century has been a time of urgency and growth in North American 
border scholarship. After the terrorist attacks that punctuated the start of the decade, the regulatory 
environment of the Canada – U.S. border changed, and it has continued to evolve into the present. 
Cross-border regions were arguably affected more acutely by changing regulations than most. They 
represent both locations of opportunity and vulnerability. The combination of locally-available 
complementarities as well as generally easy passage create opportunities unavailable elsewhere. But 
cross-border regions are also locations of vulnerability. Shifting exchange rates and regulatory 
environs, for example, create information gaps that can prove detrimental to actors who are unable 
or unwilling to navigate them.  
This project builds upon previous work addressing the changing regulatory environment, the 
impacts of change on border-located communities and actors, and the reflexive relationship that 
exists between regulatory constraints and the actions taken by those who are impacted.  
Surveys distributed to businesses throughout the Cascadia Gateway region and the Niagara Gateway 
region reveal that actors in the business community have made adjustments to their way of doing 
business in order not only to avoid border-related impediments, but to continue to grow and 
succeed in a changing North American context.   
Individuals who are highly knowledgeable about border regulations and the cross-border 
communities themselves, and who are well connected into the business environment were identified 
                                                 
11 The Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER) currently boasts legislative memberships in Washington, Oregon, 
Idaho, Montana, and Alaska in the United States; and British Columbia, Alberta, the Yukon Territory, Saskatchewan, 




as network intermediaries. Without exception, the individuals who were identified as network 
intermediaries or structural bridges for this study were highly knowledgeable about the border and 
were well networked throughout their respective cross-border business communities. The advice 
they provide to their clients and the people in their networks places responsibility on the business or 
individual to be informed and prepared, and their professional lives often included tasks of helping 
clients overcome barriers that emerged due either to being unprepared or to the randomness that 
sometimes characterizes the border.  
One item was addressed implicitly, but left unspoken:  interview participants were involved in 
multiple cross-border activities ranging from hosting or participating in workshops to involvement 
in a variety of organizations and even regional sports leagues. Intermediaries are able to provide 
professional assistance for their customers not only because they understand policy but because they 
are socially and professionally involved in their unique cross-border communities. Knowing the 
regulations, while necessary, is only part of forming and sustaining successful cross-border business 
connections.  
In other words, the benefits associated with cross-border regional location come, not as a function 
of physical proximity or regulatory familiarity, but from social and professional relationships and the 
familiarity that comes from frequent interaction. Physical proximity and preparedness play 
supporting roles in the formation and maintenance of successful networks and, ultimately, successful 
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Appendix A: Sample Cover Letter and Survey  








Since September 11, 2001, the regulatory environment and protocols associated with the Canada – U.S. 
border have undergone significant transformations. Eight years after the initial installment of new border 
policies, we are beginning to see the effects of regulatory changes on cross-border traffic flows, businesses, 
and individuals.  
 
I am writing to ask for your assistance in a study that will address the impact of recent anti-terrorism 
measures upon your company‘s cross-border supply chain. Specifically, I wish to find out how businesses 
within the borderland region of Lower Mainland, BC and Whatcom County, WA have been impacted by 
regulatory changes at the border. This survey is part of an ongoing research project at the Border Policy 
Research Institute, Western Washington University, and will be used to generate policy recommendations to 
improve border-crossing conditions.  
 
Responses to this survey will be kept anonymous, and will collectively contribute to a research / policy 
report. The goal of this report is to make policy recommendations for improving conditions of cross-border 
trade and travel. Recommendations will be made based on the experiences and feedback of people and 
businesses within this region. Your participation in this research is completely voluntary and you need not 
respond to all the questions unless you wish to do so. Thank you, by the way, for having indicated an interest 
in this study when contacted earlier this week. I appreciate your interest and look forward to your feedback. 
 
This brief survey consists of four parts. You‘ll be asked to answer general questions about your business, 
followed by questions addressing cross-border transportation, border-crossing conditions, and strategy.  
 
Would you please complete the survey (it should take no longer than ten minutes), and fax or mail it back in 
the enclosed postage-paid envelope in the next couple weeks?  A summary of the results should be published 
within the next three months. If you would like to receive a summary report, or have any questions or 
concerns about this survey, please contact Anneliese Vance at the address listed below or e-mail me at 
Anneliese.Vance@wwu.edu.  
 





Anneliese L. Vance, Ph.D. 
Visiting Fellow 
Border Policy Research Institute 
Western Washington University  
516 High Street 







Document 2: Sample Survey 
 
A. General Information  
 
1. Broad industry classification (main product line or NAICS): ________________ 
 
2. Where is this facility located? (name of city or town): _____________________ 
    How many employees work at this location?     ○ <50     ○ 51-100     ○ 101-250     ○ 251-500     ○ >500 
    Date established at this location? ________ 
    What is the primary function of this location? (Please check all that apply)  
    ○ Headquarters  ○ Regional operations  ○ Manufacturing  ○ Warehousing  ○ Distribution  ○ Other _______   
    The owner (or parent company) of this firm is:  ○ U.S Citizen   ○ Canadian Citizen   ○ Dual Citizen   ○ Other 
_________ 
 
3. Do you have facilities located elsewhere in North America?   
    Please list locations and dates established in the space below. 
 
 
4. Does this business work within a JIT system?     ○ Yes     ○ No     ○ N.A.  
 
5. Since 2001, has your business imported goods or services from the US?     ○ Yes     ○ No             
     Approximately what percent of total imports originate in the US? _____% 
        Has this changed since 2001?     ○ increased     ○ decreased     ○ no change     ○ unknown 
     Approximately what percent of US imports are transported across the border by truck? _____% 
        Has this changed since 2001?     ○ increased     ○ decreased     ○ no change     ○ unknown 
     What percent of US imports originate within 160 kilometres of this facility? _____% 
        Has this changed since 2001?     ○ increased     ○ decreased     ○ no change     ○ unknown 
     Please explain:_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
      _____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Since 2001, has your business exported goods or services to the US?     ○ Yes     ○ No              
     Approximately what percent of total exports are bound for the US market? _____% 
        Has this changed since 2001?     ○ increased     ○ decreased     ○ no change     ○ unknown 
     Approximately what percent of exports to the US are transported across the border by truck? _____% 
        Has this changed since 2001?     ○ increased     ○ decreased     ○ no change     ○ unknown 
     What percent of US-bound exports are sold within 160 kilometres of this facility? _____% 
        Has this changed since 2001?     ○ increased     ○ decreased     ○ no change     ○ unknown 
      Please explain:_________________________________________________________________________ 
 






















1. If your company owns its own vehicles, how are they used?  (check all that apply) 
       Delivery to customers in     ○ Canada     ○ US   ○ NA 
       Pick up from suppliers in    ○ Canada     ○ US   ○ NA 
    Has the extent to which company vehicles are used for cross-border business changed since 2001?      
       ○ increased     ○ decreased     ○ no change     ○ unknown 
    Please explain:_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    ______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Do you contract out for cross-border transportation services?     ○ Yes     ○ No     ○ N.A.              
    If yes, what characteristics are the most important when selecting a logistics provider? (check all that apply) 
    ○ Full load transport       ○ LTL carrier 
    ○ Large company (such as UPS or Purolator)          ○ Small independent or local carrier 
    ○ Long term relationship (since date)                ○ Lowest price 
 
3. Customs brokerage responsibilities are taken care of:  
     ○ Within this firm     ○ By third party brokers     ○ By our transportation provider     ○ Other 
 
4. Have the costs for transportation services changed since 2001?     ○ Yes     ○ No     ○ N.A 
    How much would you estimate that prices have changed?   ○ Increased   ○ Decreased by  _______%                
    How much do you estimate shifting prices are a consequence of (please rank) 
       _____ Border regulations     _____Border delays     _____Fuel prices     _____Exchange rate fluctuations 
       _____Compliance in voluntary programs such as FAST or C-TPAT     _____Other             
 
C. Border conditions 
 
On a scale of 1-5, please describe the condition of border crossings between 2000 and 2008.   
 
1a. Border crossings in this region were ___ in:                              1b. Border crossings in this region were ___ in: 
     1= Very Efficient – 5 = Very Inefficient            1= Very Consistent – 5 = Very Inconsistent  
     2000   ○ 1   ○ 2   ○ 3   ○ 4   ○ 5   ○ N.A.                           2000   ○ 1   ○ 2   ○ 3   ○ 4   ○ 5   ○ N.A. 
     2002   ○ 1   ○ 2   ○ 3   ○ 4   ○ 5   ○ N.A.                       2002   ○ 1   ○ 2   ○ 3   ○ 4   ○ 5   ○ N.A. 
     2004   ○ 1   ○ 2   ○ 3   ○ 4   ○ 5   ○ N.A.                       2004   ○ 1   ○ 2   ○ 3   ○ 4   ○ 5   ○ N.A. 
     2006   ○ 1   ○ 2   ○ 3   ○ 4   ○ 5   ○ N.A.                       2006   ○ 1   ○ 2   ○ 3   ○ 4   ○ 5   ○ N.A. 
     2008   ○ 1   ○ 2   ○ 3   ○ 4   ○ 5   ○ N.A.                       2008   ○ 1   ○ 2   ○ 3   ○ 4   ○ 5   ○ N.A. 
 
  1c. The overall cost of cross-border business was:     
     1 = Least Expensive – 5 =  Most Expensive            
     2000   ○ 1   ○ 2   ○ 3   ○ 4   ○ 5   ○ N.A 
     2002   ○ 1   ○ 2   ○ 3   ○ 4   ○ 5   ○ N.A. 
     2004   ○ 1   ○ 2   ○ 3   ○ 4   ○ 5   ○ N.A. 
     2006   ○ 1   ○ 2   ○ 3   ○ 4   ○ 5   ○ N.A. 
     2008   ○ 1   ○ 2   ○ 3   ○ 4   ○ 5   ○ N.A. 
 
   Please explain:__________________________________________________________________________ 
   
    ______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. To what extent and in what way has your firm been impacted by post-9/11 border legislation? (check one) 
       ○ Significant and Negative   ○ Negative   ○ Neutral   ○ Positive   ○ Significant and Positive   ○ Uncertain 
    Please explain: _________________________________________________________________________ 
 





3. Do you feel that your business suffered any setbacks as a consequence of changing border regulations?  
       ○ Yes     ○ No     ○ N.A     
    If yes, to what extent do you feel that your firm has recovered?  
       ○ Complete recovery   ○ Partial recovery  ○ No recovery 
    Please explain: _________________________________________________________________________ 
 
     _____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
4. Which of the following present barriers to your ability to compete in a cross-border market?  
    (Rank in order of importance).  
  ____ Border delays  ____Border regulations  ____ Other regulations (taxes, etc)  ____ Local governance (permits, etc.)    
  ____ Immigration    ____ Exchange rate       ____ Transportation costs               ____Security related costs      
  ____ Recession        ____ Competition         ____ Labor                                      ____ Other (explain) 
    Please explain: _________________________________________________________________________ 
 






1.  Have you pursued or considered any of the geographic / supply chain strategies identified in the grid below? 
  
     For the following questions, please indicate (where applicable) 
  1. The years during which any of the following strategies were pursued,  
  2. The likelihood that each strategy will be pursued in the future  
      (1= very likely, 2 = likely, 3 = uncertain, 4 = unlikely, 5 = very unlikely) 
  3-4. The city or town, and country where a strategy is being considered or has been executed 
  5. Please explain the rationale behind a strategy 
 
  Pursued 
Possible 
future 





(year) (1-5 scale) City or town 
Can / 
US   
Increase warehoused stock             
Decrease warehoused stock             
Purchase, expand, or rent 
additional facilities             
Disinvest from existing facilities             
Enroll in government programs 
such as  
□ C-TPAT, □ FAST or □ PIP            
Replace US suppliers with 
Canadian suppliers             
Replace Canadian Suppliers 
with US suppliers             
Change price structure              
Choose alternate transportation 
routes            
Choose alternate transportation 
modes             
Subcontract transportation 
services              
Increase overseas sourcing             
Relocate overseas facilities to 
North America             
Expand overseas markets             
Focus on North American 
markets             
Expand domestic (Canadian) 
sales             
Join trade organization or 
chamber of commerce             
Other (please explain below)             
 





2. Has your company undertaken employee training regarding border compliance or supply chain security?      
      ○ Yes     ○ No  
    If yes, who provided the training?    
      ○ In house   ○ Parent company   ○ Government agency   ○ Carrier or customs provider    
      ○ Trade organization   ○ Industry organization    ○ Other _____________________________________ 
 
3. What do you think is the likelihood of another major border disruption?   
     Very Likely ○ 1   ○ 2   ○ 3   ○ 4   ○ 5   Very Unlikely   ○ N.A 
 
4. Does your company have contingency plans in the event of a border slowdown?     ○ Yes     ○ No      




E. Contact Information and Follow Up 
 
The following information will be kept strictly anonymous and will be coded separately from your answers. Your contact information will be 
used only to verify whether you have participated so that I do not send you a second survey.  I would also like to send a copy of the study once 
completed.  Please indicate whether this would interest you. 
 
1. Your name and professional contact information (telephone and / or e-mail): 
 
 





3. Would you be willing to participate in a follow-up interview?     ○ Yes   ○ No 
 













Please send completed copy to Anneliese Vance at the Border Policy Research Institute, 





Appendix B: List of Participants in Qualitative Interviews 
Niagara Gateway, Ontario, Canada: 
 David Siegel Niagara Community Observatory, Brock University 
 Victor Ferraiuolo, Niagara Falls Tourism  
 Ron Rienas, Peace Bridge Commission* 
 Alan Teichrob, Niagara, Ontario, Economic Development Corporation 
 Wendy Canavan, Economic Development, City of Niagara Falls  
Niagara Gateway, New York, U.S.A.: 
 Arlene White, Binational Economic +Tourism and Alliance*  
 Maryann Stein, Erie County Industrial Development Association (ECIDA) 
 Kathryn Bryk Friedman, Regional Institute, University at Buffalo 
 Patrick Whalen, Canadian / American Border Trade Alliance (CanAm BTA)** 
 Jim Phillips, Canadian / American Border Trade Alliance (CanAm BTA)** 
 Chris Johnston, World Trade Center, Buffalo-Niagara 
 Daniel Kolundzic, Canadian Consulate General, Buffalo, NY, U.S.A. office** 
 Ed Kovalowski, Empire State Development Corporation 
 Rosanna Masucci, U.S. Trade Service 
 Jim Trubits, Mohawk Global Logistics 
 David Griggs and Carolyn Powell, Buffalo Niagara Enterprise 
Cascadia Gateway, British Columbia, Canada: 
 Marion Robson 
 Ray Hudson, Surrey Board of Trade 
 Jonathan Sparks, Small Business B.C. 
 Lynn Whitehouse, Langley Chamber of Commerce 
Cascadia Gateway, Washington, U.S.A.:  
 Matt Morrison, Pacific Northwest Economic Region* 
 Don Alper, Border Policy Research Institute (BPRI), WWU 
 Greg Boos, Cascadia Cross Border Law 
 Jim Pettinger, International Market Access 




 Hugh Conroy, International Mobility and Trade Corridor (IMTC)* 
 Peter Lloyd, Canadian Consulate General, Seattle, WA, U.S.A 
 Dodd Snodgrass, Port of Bellingham 
 Neil Norman, PE 
 
―*‖ indicates an entity whose organization structurally straddles the border and whose orientation is 
specifically regional in nature. The location listed is in these cases is the location where the interview 
took place. 
―**‖ a national level entity. The geography described here is the location where the regional office or 
headquarters is located. 
 
 
